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It is not obvious that philosophers and historians of law should take much interest in the 
scholarly enterprises of the other. Many legal philosophers understand their task as one of 
clarifying the meaning of such familiar legal concepts as “right,” “duty,” or “law” by offering 
analyses of them that purport to be general, abstract, and timeless. Meanwhile, historians 
tend to be suspicious of speculative claims ungrounded in fact and so often prefer to focus 
on the concrete, particular features of actual legal regimes. 
 
But surface appearances can deceive. Unlike some other areas of philosophy, the subject 
matter of jurisprudence is at least partially (if not entirely) a social phenomenon. For this 
reason, legal philosophers since at least H.L.A. Hart have recognized their task to be a 
“hermeneutic” one — one which aims to discern or make explicit the “self-understanding” 
of legal actors. At the same time, legal historians aim not simply to record legal rules that 
existed at some given point in history, but to unearth the meaning that actual people have 
attached to law. Perhaps, then, philosophical and historical inquiries about law share the 
same ultimate scholarly goal and subject matter. 
 
This essay serves as the Introduction to a symposium in the Virginia Law Review that 
explores just this possibility. Its purpose is both to highlight some of the themes common to 
the symposium’s essays and comments, and, more ambitiously, to suggest that these 
papers show how philosophers and historians of law might bring their respective 
disciplinary methods to bear in answering the same kind of question. In particular, both 
methods are useful for answering questions about what best explains the endurance or 
disappearance of an idea, theory, or set of concerns in legal thought or practice. Our claim 
is not that legal historians and philosophers of law should agree in the answers they give to 
such questions. They will and should often disagree. Rather, our goal is to show how 
scholars from the two disciplines may plausibly be seen as joining issue in a productive 
debate, rather than simply talking past one another. 
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ARTICLES 
JURISPRUDENCE AND (ITS) HISTORY 
Charles Barzun and Dan Priel* 
I 
T is not obvious that philosophers and historians of law should take 
much interest in the scholarly enterprises of the other. Many legal phi-
losophers understand their task as one of clarifying the meaning of fa-
miliar legal concepts, such as “right,” “duty,” “authority,” and, of 
course, “law” itself. For such an inquiry, history—either of law itself or 
of philosophical thinking about law—seems irrelevant.1 Meanwhile, his-
torians, ever on guard against speculative claims ungrounded in fact, of-
ten prefer sticking to the fine-grained details of actual legal regimes.2 
Whereas legal philosophers offer “analyses” that aim to be general, ab-
stract, and timeless, legal historians offer “thick descriptions” of what is 
particular, concrete, and time-bound.3 
But surface appearances can deceive. Perhaps unlike other areas of 
philosophy, the subject matter of jurisprudence is at least partially (if not 
* Armistead M. Dobie Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law, and Asso-
ciate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, respectively. 
1 See Andrei Marmor, Philosophy of Law 118 (2011) (“The motivation for claiming that P 
is one thing, and the truth of P is another. The former is the business of intellectual histori-
ans. Philosophy should be interested in truth.”). 
2 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and 
Change 5 (1977). But cf. David Armitage, What’s the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the 
Longue Durée, 38 Hist. Eur. Ideas 493, 493–96 (2012) (arguing that “big history” is making 
a comeback). 
3 John Henry Schlegel, Commentary, Philosophical Inquiry and Historical Practice, 101 
Va. L. Rev. 1197, 1198 (2015) (“Historians, at least my kind of historians, like what Clifford 
Geertz called ‘thick description.’”); see Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an In-
terpretive Theory of Culture, in The Interpretation of Cultures 3, 6–10 (1973). 
I
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entirely)4 a social phenomenon. Courts, legislatures, judicial orders, and 
statutes are the products of human efforts, both collective and individual, 
and they only exist as legislatures, courts, and the like insofar as they 
possess the meaning they do in the eyes of at least some social group.5 
For this reason, legal philosophers since at least H.L.A. Hart have rec-
ognized their task to be a “hermeneutic” one—one which aims to dis-
cern or make explicit the “self-understanding” of legal actors.6 At the 
same time, legal historians aim not simply to record legal rules that ex-
isted at some given point in history, but to unearth the meaning that ac-
tual people—judges, lawyers, politicians, and ordinary citizens—have 
attached to law.7 When they do so, they might be seen as uncovering ev-
idence of those same “self-understandings” that philosophers claim con-
stitute law. 
Perhaps, then, philosophical and historical inquiries about law do not 
differ so radically from each other after all.8 They share the same ulti-
4 Of course, whether it is exclusively a social phenomenon is what is arguably in dispute 
between positivists and antipositivists, or at least between Hart and Dworkin. See Jules L. 
Coleman, Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism, 22 Ratio Juris 359, 359–61 (2009). 
5 For Hart, that group need only include the officials of the regime. H.L.A. Hart, The Con-
cept of Law 113 (1961) (explaining that a system’s “rules of recognition specifying the crite-
ria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as 
common public standards of official behavior by its officials”).  
6 H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 13 (1983). On the role of a group’s 
self-understanding for jurisprudence, see Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays 
on the Morality of Law and Politics 237 (rev. ed. 2005); Marmor, supra note 1, at 33–34 
(“The philosophical question about the nature of law is one about a scheme of interpretation; 
it is a question about the collective meaning and self-understandings of a complex social re-
ality.”).  
7 See, e.g., Risa Lauren Goluboff, “Let Economic Equality Take Care of Itself”: The 
NAACP, Labor Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 
1393, 1486 (2005) (engaging in an in-depth historical study of the lawyers working for the 
NAACP in the 1940s and arguing that “[r]econstructing the NAACP’s labor-related cases in 
the 1940s reveals that the meaning of civil rights was up for grabs in the decade and a half 
before Brown”); Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 899, 934 (offering 
a detailed account of a criminal prosecution for pig-keeping in early nineteenth-century New 
York City, where the practice of pig-keeping persisted in spite of its formal illegality, in 
support of the thesis that law is properly understood “as an arena of conflict within which 
alternative social visions” contend); see also James T. Kloppenberg, The Theory and Prac-
tice of American Legal History, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1332, 1335–36 (1993) (book review) (de-
fending the method of “pragmatic hermeneutics,” which “attempts to understand . . . the 
conditions of a text’s production, the meanings its author intended, the ways in which it was 
interpreted by contemporaries, and also the meanings it has for us today”).  
8 Cf. Bernard Williams, Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, 75 Phil. 477, 491–93 
(2000) (arguing that historical understanding can aid in efforts to answer philosophical ques-
tions). 
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mate scholarly goal and subject matter—to study legal phenomena with 
the hope of gaining a clearer and deeper view of them9—and differ pri-
marily in the tools they use to reach that goal, as well as in the relative 
abstractness of the conclusions they offer. True, legal historians focus on 
the attitudes of people in the past, whereas legal philosophers remain 
more interested in the attitudes of those in the present; but that only 
means the objects of their attention differ, not the nature of their pro-
jects. And, to the extent that contemporary self-understandings require 
interpretation of past ones,10 the distinction between the two enterprises 
becomes fuzzier still. If that is right, then the mutual disregard of the 
two fields suggested at the outset may not be justified. Instead, there 
may be reason to think that turning to history could broaden the bounda-
ries, and raise the ambitions, of a field that many lawyers, judges, and 
even legal scholars have written off as esoteric and dominated by con-
cerns remote from their own.11 
The articles and commentaries in this symposium explore just this 
possibility. Some do so by taking up methodological questions directly, 
while others offer examples of what a genuinely historical form of juris-
prudence might look like. Still others point to some of the difficulties 
that any such effort entails. The aim of this introductory Article is both 
to highlight some of the themes common to the various papers and, more 
ambitiously, to argue that the papers show how philosophers and histori-
ans of law might use their respective disciplinary methods to try to an-
swer the same kind of question. That question is about why certain ideas 
in and about law persist or disappear in history. Our claim is not that le-
gal philosophers and historians agree as to how to answer this question; 
9 As John Henry Schlegel puts it in his commentary, the question of meaning lies at the 
heart of both philosophy and history, “so holding this conference is not a mistake.” See 
Schlegel, supra note 3, at 1199.  
10 See Jessica K. Lowe, Radicalism’s Legacy: American Legal History Since 1998, at 10 
(Nov. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2520545) (ob-
serving that “one of the special attributes of legal history is that, especially given common 
law’s penchant for precedent, the past often still structures the world we live in”); see also 
Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism 116–117 (1998) (“The intellectual historian can 
help us to appreciate how far the values embodied in our present way of life, and our present 
ways of thinking about those values, reflect a series of choices made at different times be-
tween different possible worlds.”). 
11 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes 34 (2006) (observing that analytic legal phi-
losophers “talk mainly to one another and have become marginalized within the academy 
and the profession”). Of course, it may also be true that a turn toward jurisprudence could 
improve legal history, but that is not the focus of this symposium. 
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to the contrary, they do and should often disagree. The point, however, 
is that they can plausibly be seen as joining issue in a productive debate, 
rather than simply talking past each other. Admittedly, our suggestion 
along these lines raises deep and knotty questions about the nature of 
meaning and truth to which we cannot possibly offer adequate answers. 
But we hope to show that the symposium at least pushes the inquiry in 
the right direction. 
Doing so first requires considering how jurisprudence can or should 
make use of history and why doing so might be philosophically profita-
ble. These questions are taken up directly in the contributions of Gerald 
Postema and Nicola Lacey. Drawing in part on a largely forgotten essay 
by Michael Oakeshott,12 Postema argues that jurisprudence ought to 
strive to be a more “sociable” science than the currently dominant ana-
lytic style of jurisprudence allows.13 That philosophical method, which 
relies heavily on our ordinary intuitions about the meaning of legal con-
cepts, is both too narrow in its scope, because it seals itself off from oth-
er disciplinary methods, and too complacent in its aims, because it fails 
to question the validity of those intuitions.14 If we look to earlier philos-
ophers of law, who strove to offer what were, for Oakeshott, the only 
properly philosophical explanations of law, namely those that relate its 
subject matter to the “totality of experience,” then we can see how juris-
prudence can broaden and deepen its aspirations.15 Moreover, such a his-
torical approach to theorizing about law is particularly warranted in the 
realm of legal philosophy since law itself is a reflective practice that 
must not reflect only on itself and on its past, but also on its own prior 
reflections of itself.16 
Lacey, too, argues that law is a practice that constantly demands en-
gagement with, and interpretation of, its own past.17 Also like Postema, 
she emphasizes the way in which history and other social sciences offer 
 
12 See Michael Oakeshott, The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence (pts. 1 & 2), 3 
Politica 203, 214, 221, 345, 352 (1938).  
13 Gerald J. Postema, Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science, 101 Va. L. Rev. 869 (2015). 
14 See id. at 871 (2015). 
15 Oakeshott, supra note 12, at 352; Postema, supra note 13, at 879–80.  
16 Postema, supra note 13, at 885. As David Luban observes, this is a theme that Postema 
has also explored in the past in Gerald J. Postema, Melody and Law’s Mindfulness of Time, 
17 Ratio Juris. 203, 207–208, 221, 223 (2004). See David Luban, Commentary, Time-
Mindedness and Jurisprudence, 101 Va. L. Rev. 903, 910–11 (2015) see also Gerald J. 
Postema, On the Moral Presence of Our Past, 36 McGill L.J. 1153, 1156–57 (1991). 
17 Nicola Lacey, Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law, 101 Va. L. 
Rev. 919, 920 (2015). 
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the legal theorist resources with which to develop more critical under-
standings of current practices.18 For Lacey, however, the critical edge 
derives at least in part from showing the historical contingency of cur-
rent practices and the assumptions that underlie them.19 Once one sees 
how a complex interplay of interests, institutions, and ideas have shaped 
our current understandings of various legal concepts, those concepts no 
longer appear as universal or timeless as philosophers sometimes as-
sume. In other words, history reminds us that what strikes us as “natu-
ral,” “necessary,” or “essential” only appears so from the vantage point 
of a particular point in history. Thus, whereas Postema focuses on the 
historical development of ideas within jurisprudential discourse, Lacey 
takes up more directly the developments within legal practice—the ob-
ject of jurisprudential reflection. 
In short, for both Postema and Lacey, philosophizing about law re-
quires a historical approach at least in part because of law’s own de-
pendence on its past. They also concur in suggesting that a turn towards 
history promises to make the field broader in its scope, deeper in its un-
derlying explanations, and more critical of contemporary legal thought 
and practice. So framed, however, such virtues remain highly abstract, 
and thus their concrete meaning is hard to discern. How exactly do his-
torical materials figure into the inquiry? And what role must they play to 
deliver the benefits described? To get a firmer grip on such questions, it 
may help to look at some actual uses of historical materials for jurispru-
dential purposes. 
II 
Broadly speaking, the articles and commentaries in this symposium 
make use of history in one of two ways. First, history is used in a nega-
tive or critical way in order to cast into doubt some of today’s legal prac-
tices or assumptions underlying those practices. Second, historical fig-
ures are invoked in a more positive or constructive vein as guides for 
how to conduct philosophical inquiry going forward, or what to focus 
that inquiry on. Below we briefly describe these approaches and their 
potential virtues, offering examples of each. We then consider whether 
these two uses of history conflict with one another. In fact, they do stand 
in a certain tension with one another, but we argue that the tension is a 
 
18 Id. at 924–26. 
19 Id. 
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healthy one because it points toward the kind of historical question on 
which both historical and philosophical methods may be usefully 
brought to bear in answering. 
The first use of history invokes historical facts, events, and ultimately, 
explanations, in order to reveal the contingency of our current practices. 
The idea is that doing so liberates us from our current assumptions and 
practices by showing us that things could have been otherwise. The goal 
is to reveal the way in which the past was different from the present and 
to demonstrate that the concepts and values we take for granted today 
arose for reasons unrelated to their intrinsic truth or coherence. We 
might dub this the “contingency argument.” 
As already noted, Lacey endorses the contingency argument as a gen-
eral matter, but she also demonstrates its power through the example of 
criminal responsibility. Specifically, she shows how the doctrinal and 
philosophical debates that take place today about criminal responsibility 
all assume that responsibility is constituted by various cognitive and vo-
litional states of mind. This conception of responsibility, however, is 
historically a relatively recent one, and it arose along with, and as result 
of, the development of various legal institutions, which themselves were 
the consequence, at least in part, of the British government’s desire to 
use the criminal law to protect and legitimize its own authority.20 Once 
we see the way in which our understandings today developed within 
such institutional structures and as a result of such ideological cam-
paigns, we realize that our “intuitive” understandings of criminal re-
sponsibility are neither as natural nor as necessary as we might other-
wise think. 
Frederick Schauer also makes use of a contingency argument in his 
contribution to the symposium. Although much of his article is devoted 
to showing the importance of Jeremy Bentham’s views on various juris-
prudential questions, he also argues (as his title suggests)21 that those 
views have been neglected not because analysis and scrutiny have re-
vealed them to be unsound, but rather because the self-conception of le-
gal philosophers has evolved in such a way as to make Bentham’s con-
cerns appear to be outside the bounds of jurisprudence.22 Thus, for 
instance, Bentham’s claims about the importance of coercion to law 
 
20 Id. at 939–41. 
21 Frederick Schauer, The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism, 101 Va. L. Rev. 957, 957 
(2015). 
22 Id. at 973–75. 
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have been understood, by Hart and subsequent theorists, to be about a 
topic “best left to the sociologists and the psychologists.”23 
The contingency argument displays some of the benefits a historical 
approach promised to offer. First, the argument has genuine critical bite. 
It not only serves to weaken our commitment to the particular concept 
under scrutiny (for example, criminal responsibility), freeing us up to 
consider radically different ways of conceptualizing human action; it al-
so suggests that legal concepts in general are often the contingent prod-
ucts of historical forces, not the universal and timeless entities contem-
porary legal philosophers take them to be.24 
Second, the contingency argument seems particularly well suited to 
the historical study of legal concepts since the question of whether, and 
if so how, the meaning of particular concepts has changed over time is 
of special importance to courts and legal scholars. For this reason, these 
days this kind of argument is probably the most common way in which 
legal historians have invoked history as a basis for criticizing current le-
gal practices.25 
One limitation of this approach, however, is that it seems to be almost 
exclusively critical. Although it may help weaken some of our convic-
tions about contemporary values or ideas, it offers little with which to 
replace them. Furthermore, taken to its logical conclusion it denies a 
vantage point from which the ideas of a different time (or culture) can be 
criticized. We do things one way because of our philosophy (of law); 
our ancestors did it another because they had a different philosophy. Nor 
does it point the way to a deep or broad explanation of legal phenomena 
of the sort Postema suggests Oakeshott sought. To the contrary, its func-
tion is to shrink our horizons by emphasizing the extent to which even 
 
23 Id. at 973. 
24 Lacey, supra note 17, at 927; see Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the 
History of Ideas, in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics 29, 67 (James 
Tully ed., 1988) (“A knowledge of the history of such ideas can then serve to show the ex-
tent to which those features of our own arrangements which we may be disposed to accept as 
traditional or even ‘timeless’ truths may in fact be the merest contingencies of our peculiar 
history and social structure.” (citation omitted)). 
25 See Lowe, supra note 10, at 10 (endorsing the view that contingency “is one of the ma-
jor gifts that history has to offer law: the reminder that things don’t have to look the way 
they do, that there have been many options, many possibilities”). Classics of this sort of his-
torical critique include, among many others, Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of Ameri-
can Law, 1780-1860 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1977);  and Robert W. Gordon, Historicism 
in Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1017 (1981).  
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our most fundamental assumptions about law are particular to our own 
time and place.26 
Such limitations motivate a turn to the other, more constructive use of 
history. This approach draws on the work of historical figures in order to 
provide guidance as to what jurisprudential questions we ought to be 
asking today or how we ought to be pursuing answers to those questions. 
The aim here is to reinterpret a tradition of thought by suggesting alter-
native paths that the tradition could have taken and should still take to-
day.27 Precisely because our values and perspectives are influenced by 
our history, there is value in mining it for new ideas and perspectives to 
challenge prevailing ones. It does so by pointing either to neglected fig-
ures or to neglected aspects of the thought of already-established figures. 
We might class such uses of history as efforts in “canon reconstruc-
tion.”28 
Dan Priel’s contribution to the symposium can be seen as such an ef-
fort with respect to the work of Jeremy Bentham and Thomas Hobbes. 
Today, those theorists are considered “legal positivists,” because they 
were highly critical of the natural law view endorsed in their day. But 
what today’s scholars tend to ignore is how different were the grounds 
of their rejection of natural law. Unlike today’s positivists, who criticize 
 
26 A further problem is that this approach encourages a highly schematic view of history 
(of ideas), one in which people in a particular historical period subscribe to a particular phi-
losophy, only to see it replaced a generation or two later by another dominant view to which 
all seemingly subscribe. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal 
Thought: 1850–2000, in The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal 
19, 21 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).  
27 We take Schauer to have had something like this in mind when he explained at the sym-
posium that he aimed in his paper to “designate a tradition of thought,” namely legal positiv-
ism. Frederick Schauer, Address at the Program in Legal and Constitutional History and 
Virginia Law Review Association Symposium: Jurisprudence and (Its) History (Sept. 20, 
2014).  
28 We borrow this term largely from Richard Rorty, who describes such a philosophical 
use of history as “canon-formation.” Richard Rorty, The Historiography of Philosophy: Four 
Genres, in Philosophy in History 49, 56 (Richard Rorty et al. eds., 1984). According to Ror-
ty, scholars who adopt this approach are concerned with determining which philosophers are 
the truly great ones. In so doing, they ask such questions as “‘Why should anyone have made 
the question of––central to his thought?’ or ‘Why did anyone take the problem of––
seriously?’” Id. at 57. For an example of a more literal sense of canon formation in the legal 
context, see The Canon of American Legal Thought (William W. Fisher III & David Kenne-
dy eds., 2006). See Steven Walt, Commentary, What Can the History of Jurisprudence Do 
for Jurisprudence?, 101 Va. L. Rev. 977, 978. (2015) (“Past jurisprudential positions might 
be used to present alternatives that challenge contemporary jurisprudential assumptions or, 
more weakly, at least aid in better understanding them.”). 
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natural lawyers for wrongfully injecting metaphysical or normative 
questions into what they think are properly conceptual questions, Ben-
tham and Hobbes rejected the natural law theories of their time because 
they thought they were based on a false metaphysics and had unattrac-
tive normative implications.29 Priel thus suggests that reading Bentham 
and Hobbes reminds us that there are deeper and more pressing ques-
tions than those that contemporary jurisprudents take to be central to the 
philosophy of law, such as what the conditions of “legal validity” are—
something primarily of interest to lawyers.30 
Alice Ristroph makes a similar point about Hobbes, though she fo-
cuses on Hobbes’s theory of punishment. Ristroph recognizes that 
Hobbes’s view of punishment cannot easily be placed on today’s juris-
prudential landscape, where “retributiv[ist]” theories of punishment tend 
to be distinguished from those based on “deterrence” rationales. Never-
theless, she insists “the fault lies in our categories, and not in Hobbes.”31 
For what concerned Hobbes was not the ground on which punishment 
might be justified but rather whether citizens have a right to resist pun-
ishment even when the state has the authority to command it. According 
to Ristroph, when Hobbes says that the right of self-preservation is one 
we cannot give up even when we enter into civil society, he was neither 
making a psychological claim nor a descriptive, conceptual claim about 
the nature of obligation; rather, he was making a normative claim about 
our obligations to each other and to the state.32 Furthermore, the fact that 
Hobbes was deeply engaged in the politics of his day supports rather 
than detracts from this interpretation, since it suggests that for him legal 
theory was a moral and political activity through and through.33 
Using history to reconstruct or reinterpret canonical figures of a tradi-
tion also offers some of the benefits described above by Lacey and 
Postema.34 Like the contingency argument, it denies that we should ac-
cept today’s intuitions as the fixed data to be explained, but unlike that 
 
29 See Dan Priel, Toward Classical Legal Positivism, 101 Va. L. Rev. 987, 995, 999, 
1000–01 (2015).  
30 Id. at 996. But see Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Commentary, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1023, 1026 
(2015) (responding to Priel by arguing that a general jurisprudence ought not dismiss entire-
ly the attitudes and concerns of “legal officials and legally conscious citizens”). 
31 See Alice Ristroph, Sovereignty and Subversion, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1029, 1030 (2015). 
32 Id. at 1035–36. 
33 Id. at 1052–53. 
34 Postema himself has engaged in canon reconstruction in his reading of Bentham’s legal 
positivism. See Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition 302–36 (1986).  
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approach it offers a vantage point from which to criticize current prac-
tice. In doing so, efforts in canon reconstruction can challenge not just 
certain prevailing ideas but the whole canon built around certain histori-
cal classics. A canon is often constructed in such a way that later works 
are seen as improvements upon, or corrections of, previous works. Since 
this process depends on accepted readings of those older works, new in-
terpretations that challenge those readings might destabilize, or even 
decanonize, more recent works. But this approach seeks to do more. 
That Hobbes and Bentham challenged the conventional wisdom of their 
day on fundamental questions of human psychology and morality, for 
instance, is helpful for us today when those questions are frequently cast 
aside as a distraction. 
Finally, insofar as this approach draws on historical materials as a 
genuine source of guidance, it seems to fit naturally with traditional le-
gal methods of reasoning. Consider, for instance, John Mikhail’s contri-
bution, which is in many ways an effort in canon reconstruction in the 
context of substantive law.35 In taking issue with the prevailing assump-
tion that the United States Constitution grants the federal government 
only enumerated powers, Mikhail argues that judges and scholars have 
long misinterpreted the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I. In of-
fering a novel reading of that clause, he not only engages in a philosoph-
ical analysis of textual evidence from the constitutional convention, but 
also argues that our misreading of the clause owes in part to our focus on 
the wrong Framer: We have been looking to James Madison to guide our 
understanding of the provision, rather than to James Wilson, who actual-
ly drafted it.36 Once we understand how Wilson’s background as a busi-
ness lawyer informed his efforts to draft that clause, we can see that it 
grants a great deal of power to the United States government to fulfill its 
corporate purpose of providing for the general welfare.37 
The question facing any effort in canon reconstruction, however, is 
whether it can itself withstand the challenge of contingency. If, as the 
contingency argument suggests, even the questions that past thinkers 
asked arose in particular contexts, either as “moves” within a particular 
 
35 See John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Impli-
cature, and Implied Powers, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1063, 1076–81 (2015). 
36 Id. at 1084–91. 
37 Id. at 1085–91. 
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political or ideological struggle,38 or as a response to particular institu-
tional pressures,39 then there is little reason to think that they will have 
much philosophical payoff outside of that historical context.40 Indeed, 
this is precisely why historians tend to be skeptical about such efforts 
and worry that they entail distortion, rather than genuine discovery, of 
the relevant historical texts.41 
The articles discussed so far thus appear to present us with two differ-
ent and incompatible approaches to the history of ideas. The apparent 
incompatibility stems from the fact that they seem to depend on contra-
dictory assumptions. The contingency argument assumes that particular 
philosophical or jurisprudential texts cannot transcend their times or 
places, whereas efforts in canon reconstruction assume that they can and 
do. One can see how this conflict maps onto, and in part explains, the 
diverging scholarly self-understandings of philosophers and historians 
noted at the outset. Whereas the historian assumes ideas and meanings to 
be local, contingent, and contextual, philosophers assume them to be 
universal, necessary, and timeless. It seems we are back where we start-
ed. 
Thankfully, the contradiction is merely apparent. That is because it 
arises only if one assumes at the outset that a particular relationship be-
tween ideas and the historical contexts in which they develop holds in 
general, and such an assumption is not necessary. Instead, what that pre-
cise relationship is in any particular case ought to be precisely the issue 
in dispute. That is, it ought to be an open question whether any particu-
lar text, idea, theory, or set of concerns is best understood as merely a 
 
38 See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil 
Libertarianism 12–13 (1992) (arguing that the democratic justification for the protection of 
free speech was strategically formulated by political Progressives in order to provide a theo-
ry for the protection of speech that did not also justify protection of the contract and property 
rights to which they were ideologically opposed).  
39 See, e.g., Lacey, supra note 17, at 928; supra text accompanying note 17. 
40 This is, for example, the view expressed by philosopher Gilbert Harman as described in 
Tom Sorell, On Saying No to History of Philosophy, in Analytic Philosophy and History of 
Philosophy 43, 43–44 (Tom Sorell & G.A.J. Rogers eds., 2005) (“For the most part the prob-
lems that historical writers were concerned with are different from the problems that current 
philosophers face. There are no perennial philosophical problems.”).  
41 Skinner, supra note 24, at 57 (criticizing philosophical analyses of past philosophical 
works that focus exclusively on the texts and suggesting as an alternative an approach that 
recognizes “that our ideas constitute ‘a response to more immediate circumstances’, and that 
we should in consequence study not the texts in themselves, but rather ‘the context of other 
happenings which explains them’”).  
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contingent product of certain historical circumstances, or instead as 
something whose development or endurance is due to its coherence or 
truth. Under this view, rather than assuming that some legal term such as 
“right” or “law” describes a general concept with certain essential fea-
tures, the scholar must try to determine whether in fact it has multiple, 
shifting meanings, depending on the time and place. By the same token, 
rather than assuming that today’s legal terms meant something different 
in the past, the scholar must look and see whether they share common 
elements with older versions. More generally, as David Luban empha-
sized at the symposium conference, the degree of continuity between the 
past and the present, or between different periods in the past, ought to be 
an open question, settled after investigation rather than prior to it.42  
So understood, the tension between the two uses of history for juris-
prudence found in the symposium articles and commentaries does not so 
much expose methodological incompatibility as it does reveal the kind 
of question a genuinely historical jurisprudence might focus on. That 
question is: What best explains either the endurance or disappearance of 
some idea, theory, question, or set of philosophical concerns? The as-
sumption underlying the question is that it counts in favor of that idea or 
set of understandings that it has endured through time, but only if it has 
so endured for the right kinds of reasons. Of course, a lot depends on 
what one means by the “right kinds of reasons,” but that just goes to 
show that it is a question which is properly investigated using philosoph-
ical as well as historical methods. 
An example may help show what we mean. In the case of criminal re-
sponsibility, if historical arguments purporting to show that our current 
understandings of responsibility have only taken the shape they have be-
cause of powerful economic and political forces—which we have little 
reason to think track the truth or coherence of those understandings—
then such explanations may reveal them to be local, contingent, transito-
ry, and hence less worthy of our (philosophical) attention and respect.43 
At the same time, though, philosophical arguments showing how those 
understandings hold together or could reasonably have held appeal to 
 
42 David J. Luban, Comments at the Program in Legal and Constitutional History and Vir-
ginia Law Review Association Symposium: Jurisprudence and (Its) History (Sept. 19, 2014).  
43 See Charles Taylor, The Hermeneutics of Conflict, in Meaning & Context: Quentin 
Skinner and His Critics, supra note 24, at 218, 224. Taylor dubs “neo-Clausewitzian” the 
view of history according to which “the relevant factors in explaining how ideas become 
prevalent or die away have nothing to do with truth.” Id.  
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those who endorsed them would suggest an intellectual, rather than po-
litical or economic, explanation for its endurance. In so doing, such an 
explanation bolsters the credentials of today’s understandings of respon-
sibility as a philosophically coherent and enduring conceptual frame-
work for analyzing and evaluating human action.44 
In short, our suggestion is that the two uses of history contained in the 
articles and commentaries that follow might fruitfully be seen as two 
distinct methods of inquiry, both of which aim at the same sort of schol-
arly question. The two methods are antagonistic with one another when 
brought to bear on the same set of ideas or understandings, but they may 
also complement each other, such as when demonstrating that the con-
tingency of one idea or understanding is used to clear a path for the re-
construction of another one.45 In either case, the questions raised are his-
torical in the sense that they are about what explains the endurance over 
time of a particular idea or set of ideas; but they are philosophical in the 
sense that the kinds of explanations offered are understood to bear on the 
philosophical value or status of those ideas. When taking up such ques-
tions, the relationship between jurisprudence and its history becomes it-
self part of the scholarly enterprise. 
III 
We conclude this introduction by raising an objection to the kind of 
historical jurisprudence described above. The objection takes the form of 
a dilemma with respect to the role history plays in such an inquiry. Spe-
cifically, it alleges that the method of canon reconstruction either treats 
historical figures and texts as jurisprudential authorities, thereby under-
 
44 Such an explanation of modern-day notions of criminal responsibility, for instance, is 
arguably implicit in Kim Ferzan’s conclusion that, in her kind of history, responsibility is 
“the fixed star—the constant over space and time—that shines light on the truth of when in-
dividuals ought to be punished and casts shadows when our practices have led us astray.” 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Commentary, Of Weevils and Witches: What Can We Learn From 
the Ghost of Responsibility Past?, 101 Va. L. Rev. 947, 956 (2015). 
45 Schauer makes use of both methods in this complementary way. He argues both that the 
important role coercion plays in law has been neglected for reasons of “path dependence” 
(contingency argument) and that Bentham’s insights about the role of coercion in law 
(among other things) remain not only intelligible but also persuasive today (canon recon-
struction). Each argument reinforces the other. Schauer, supra note 21, at 972–73, 976. 
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mining its philosophical credentials, or treats them in a purely instru-
mental way, thereby undermining its historical credentials.46 
To see how this dilemma arises, it may help to go back to the legal 
analogy. Recall our suggestion above that it counts in favor of the uses 
of history just described that courts and scholars use history in a similar 
way when interpreting substantive law. But one might object that the de-
fect of traditional legal argument is precisely that it conflates and con-
fuses descriptive and normative claims. In his contribution, for instance, 
Lawrence Solum distinguishes between constitutional interpretation, 
which involves interpreting the communicative content of a given legal 
text, and constitutional construction, which involves determining the 
practical legal effect of that communicative content.47 Although judges 
must engage in both sorts of activity, the natures of the two enterprises 
are very different. The former is primarily a factual inquiry about what 
particular people intended to communicate, whereas the latter is primari-
ly a normative one about the role that those communicative intentions 
ought to play in constitutional adjudication. Thus, Solum might say in 
reference to John Mikhail’s article that we should frankly recognize the 
difference between (1) the meaning James Wilson intended to convey 
(or was understood to have conveyed) by drafting the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in the way he did (a factual claim—if an admittedly diffi-
cult one to discover), and (2) what the legal consequences of his com-
municative content properly are (a normative or theoretical claim).48 
The particular question Solum is concerned with is whether, or in 
what sense, intellectual historians aim to recover such communicative 
intentions, which is an issue with important consequences for how legal 
theorists use intellectual history. Whatever the answer to that question, 
however, it is not hard to see that there are important similarities be-
tween the notion of constitutional construction and what we have called 
efforts in canon reconstruction. Both activities require determining how 
exactly certain words and actions from the past bear on the normative 
 
46 As explained below, the contingency argument faces a comparable dilemma. See infra 
pp. 863–64.  
47 Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 Va. L. Rev. 
1111, 1118–20 (2015). 
48 Indeed, Deborah Hellman suggests that, under Mikhail’s reading of Wilson, according 
to which Wilson may have been deliberately obscure in his choice of words, the legal conse-
quences might be that the Constitution itself is illegitimate since it would imply that the peo-
ple who ratified it did not understand what they were ratifying. See Deborah Hellman, 
Commentary, Unintended Implications, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1105, 1108–10 (2015). 
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question of what we should do (or believe) today. In that way, the dis-
tinction forces upon the defender of a historically informed jurispru-
dence a difficult question: Of what philosophical significance is it that a 
particular person or group of people in the past voiced certain ideas or 
made certain arguments? 
Unfortunately, looking to traditional legal reasoning does not seem to 
help us answer this question, because the legal analogy appears to break 
down. Whereas the communicative intentions of past legal actors are 
treated as constitutionally (or, more generally, legally) authoritative for 
reasons of political morality—whether those related to democratic legit-
imacy, the rule of law, or both—it is hard to see why past jurisprudential 
texts should carry any comparable authoritative weight with respect to 
philosophical thinking about law today. The concerns of the philosopher 
of law are theoretical, one might argue, rather than practical in the way 
that those of the judge or the lawyer are. 
One possible answer is that canon reconstruction involves genuine 
deference to a theoretical authority.49 Under this view, since Bentham 
was more intelligent than most of us, we should defer to his judgment 
about what is true and important.50 But that answer is deeply unsatisfy-
ing. For one thing, we know a lot more today about a lot of things rele-
vant to law and legal theory than Bentham did.51 Besides, appeals to au-
thority traditionally have been seen to be inconsistent with the 
philosophical spirit of free and open inquiry. 
Another possibility is that we simply need philosophical heroes to 
keep us going, so that we turn to them for inspirational or emotional 
 
49 See Joseph Raz, The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception, 90 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1003, 1032 (2006) (“Theoretical authorities are experts whose knowledge and un-
derstanding of the matter on which they are authorities is both exceptionally extensive and 
remarkably systematic and secure, making them reliable guides on those matters.”). 
50 See Aloysius Martinich, Notes and Discussions: Philosophical History of Philosophy, 41 
J. Hist. Phil. 405, 406 (2003). (“[T]he major figures of the history of philosophy are better 
philosophers than all but a few of our colleagues. So careful attention to what those philoso-
phers have said probably has a better payoff than merely using their words as an inspiration 
for our own thoughts. If one thousand living philosophers possess more philosophical truth 
than earlier philosophers, it is because, exceptions excepted, they are dwarves sitting on the 
shoulders of giants.”). 
51 Bentham himself would concede as much: “As between individual and individual living 
at the same time and in the same situation, he who is old possesses, as such, more experience 
than he who is young. But, as between generation and generation, the reverse of this is true.” 
Jeremy Bentham, Handbook of Political Fallacies 44, 45 n.1 (Harold A. Larrabee ed., 1952). 
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purposes.52 We care about what questions Bentham and Hobbes were 
asking, for instance, because they are the Great Thinkers in a long and 
storied intellectual tradition from which we derive inspiration and self-
validation. But again, that seems an insufficiently philosophical justifi-
cation for attending to their ideas. 
Yet another possibility is that there is an essential, rather than merely 
contingent, connection between a thinker’s canonical status within a tra-
dition and the relative breadth and depth of his or her philosophical 
aims. Under this view, it is no mere accident that Bentham and Hobbes 
grounded their theories of law in larger moral and metaphysical frame-
works but twenty-first-century theorists no longer feel the need to do 
so.53 Our legal practices have developed in such a way as to make cer-
tain assumptions about, for instance, the important differences between 
law and morality, seem natural and intuitive, but that is true in part be-
cause of the influence of thinkers like Bentham and Hobbes. Thus only 
by recovering the arguments they felt compelled to make at a time when 
such assumptions could not be taken for granted can we get an adequate 
sense of the philosophical stakes involved. At least one of us (Barzun) is 
drawn to this approach. Even so, it is not clear that it offers a genuine al-
ternative to treating canonical thinkers as authoritative, rather than just a 
more attractive basis for doing so. 
Thus, one horn of the dilemma seems to require the defender of his-
torical jurisprudence to justify her interest in the past as a form of defer-
ence to authority in a way that is philosophically unpalatable. The other 
horn requires conceding that the fact that a particular thinker from the 
past wrote a text or developed certain arguments is not of any intrinsic 
significance at all. All that matters is the substantive philosophical value 
of the author’s text or argument. 
Consider, for instance, Brian Leiter’s contribution to the symposium. 
Leiter argues that it counts in favor of Hart’s positivist theory of law that 
 
52 See Rorty, supra note 28, at 73 (“[W]e cannot get along without heroes. We need moun-
tain peaks to look up towards. We need to tell ourselves detailed stories about the mighty 
dead in order to make our hopes of surpassing them concrete.”).  
53 See Charles Taylor, Philosophy and its History, in Philosophy in History, supra note 28, 
at 17, 27 (“[T]he fact that our practices are shaped by formulations, and that these impart a 
certain direction to their development, makes it the case that self-understanding and reformu-
lation sends us back to the past: to the paradigms which have informed development, or the 
repressed goods which have been at work.”). 
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it fits Marx’s theory of historical change better than its rivals do.54 The 
reason is that only a positivist account of law can account for both ideo-
logical forms of law in a capitalist society and nonideological laws in a 
more advanced communist society.55 The same cannot be said for a theo-
ry of law, such as Ronald Dworkin’s, which makes the existence of law 
depend on its satisfaction of moral criteria. Leiter emphasizes, however, 
that the reason its natural fit with Marx’s theory is a “data point” in fa-
vor of Hartian positivism is because Marx’s theory contains genuine in-
sight.56 That is, for Leiter’s purposes, it hardly matters that Marx lived in 
a particular time or had a specific kind of influence on subsequent think-
ers; what matters is the intrinsic explanatory power of his theory. 
Under this view, then, history drops out of the inquiry fairly quickly. 
We might look to Bentham or Hobbes, for instance, to get interesting 
ideas about what issues to take up or what topics might call for philo-
sophical scrutiny; we might study their works because we think that they 
contain valuable insights.57 But the fact that those thinkers lived in the 
past or occupy a certain status in the history of jurisprudential thought 
has little bearing on the evaluation of their arguments. To borrow the 
evocative phrase Steven Walt used at the symposium conference, history 
serves as little more than a “topic pump.”58 
If Walt’s suggestion is that history’s philosophical value is exhausted 
by its role as a topic pump for current philosophers, then the effort to ar-
ticulate a genuinely historical form of jurisprudence will have largely 
failed. Under this view, efforts in canon reconstruction consist of little 
more than purely instrumental uses of texts from the past. Such uses can 
therefore be openly anachronistic and unconcerned with the context in 
 
54 Brian Leiter, Marx, Law, Ideology, Legal Positivism, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1179, 1179 
(2015). Or at least positivism fits more comfortably than does Dworkin’s interpretive ap-
proach. At the symposium conference, Mark Murphy suggested that a natural law theory of 
law might fit even better with Marx’s theory than does positivism. Mark C. Murphy, Com-
ments at the Program in Legal and Constitutional History and Virginia Law Review Associa-
tion Symposium: Jurisprudence and (Its) History (Sept. 20, 2014). For Leiter’s response, see 
Leiter, supra, at 1189–91. 
55 Leiter, supra note 54, at 1193. 
56 Id. at 1179. 
57 It is a notable and interesting fact about Hobbes, however, that for all the admiration in 
which he is held by many contemporary philosophers, very few actually accept his actual 
substantive views.  
58 Steven D. Walt, Comments at the Program in Legal and Constitutional History and Vir-
ginia Law Review Association Symposium: Jurisprudence and (Its) History (Sept. 20, 2014). 
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which the texts were written.59 Meanwhile, contingency arguments are 
rendered philosophically impotent because what matters for assessing 
theories and arguments is not who happened to endorse them or why 
they did so, but rather whether those theories and arguments themselves 
can survive the application of today’s philosophical criteria (whether ep-
istemic or moral). The fact that people in the past held different views 
from ours in no way undermines our own views so long as we have rea-
son to think them better than those of our predecessors.60 
It seems, then, that the hopes for a genuinely historical form of juris-
prudence are stuck on the horns of a dilemma. Either the history of ju-
risprudential thought does no work, as such, in evaluating philosophical 
ideas about law or, insofar as it does do work, it reduces to a (philosoph-
ically suspect) claim to authority. How can one escape this dilemma? 
Rather than trying to answer this question conclusively ourselves, we 
invite readers to consider it as they read through the articles and com-
mentaries that follow. But we do offer tentatively one further possible 
line of response. Recall that we were only forced to choose between his-
tory-as-authoritative-source and history-as-mere-topic-pump because we 
accepted the distinction Solum draws between the communicative con-
tent of the text of a past legal actor (or theorist) and the present-day legal 
(or jurisprudential) significance we attach to it. But perhaps properly in-
terpreting texts from the past requires making philosophical evaluations 
of them today.61 Indeed, such a possibility is implicit in our suggestion 
above that philosophical argument can itself be an aid in answering his-
torical questions about how and why ideas endure or fail to endure over 
time. 
This suggestion is deeply controversial (to put it mildly), not least be-
cause it appears to entail an untenable form of historical idealism in 
 
59 See Introduction to Philosophy in History, supra note 28, at 1, 6 (“To say that such his-
tories are anachronistic is true but pointless. They are supposed to be anachronistic.”). Phi-
losophers’ use of history in this way is of course analogous to the lawyer’s much-derided 
“law office history.” See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 119, 132. 
60 Cf. Ferzan, supra note 44, at 7 (discussing various trials of animals in the past and con-
cluding: “I don’t see the caterpillars as having criminal responsibility. I see that our best 
moral theories about what is required for responsibility, rationality and volitional capacities, 
yield that the criminal justice system was being used for misguided ends.”). 
61 See G. Edward White, Commentary, Intellectual History and Constitutional Decision 
Making, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1165, 1168–71 (2015) (questioning whether discerning the com-
municative content of a constitutional provision is entirely a factual inquiry, as Solum sug-
gests). 
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which ideas lie latent in texts undiscovered even by those who wrote 
them. In this way, it seems to endorse a long-discredited “Whig history” 
in which history marches to a beat of some inexorable unfolding of cer-
tain ideas.62 True, the common law method of adjudication has some-
times been understood to be premised on something like this idea—a 
view under which courts decide cases on the basis of reasons even they 
have not fully articulated to themselves.63 But many today regard that 
interpretation of common law decision making, and the form of analogi-
cal reasoning it seems to depend on, as largely a smokescreen for what is 
a much more conscious and willful process.64 Perhaps taking a genuinely 
historical approach to jurisprudence requires one to engage in the same 
sort of debate. If so, then it would turn out that longstanding debates 
about the nature and validity of traditional forms of legal reasoning recur 
at the level of legal theory.65 That in itself may count as an interesting 
connection between law, its history and historicity, and jurisprudence. 
 
62 See Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History, at v–vi (1931); see also 
Skinner, supra note 24, at 67.  
63 See Lon L. Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3 Nat. L.F. 83, 98 (1958) (offering 
up hypothetical common law cases as examples of what Fuller called “the collaborative ar-
ticulation of shared purposes,” by which he meant that such cases, even if separated by half 
centuries, could “show that communication among men, and a consideration by them of dif-
ferent situations of fact, can enable them to see more truly what they were all trying to do 
from the beginning”). 
64 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in 
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573, 585 (2000).  
65 Cf. Schlegel, supra note 3, at 1199 (“[U]nlike historians (and lawyers, I might add) [ana-
lytic philosophers] do not much like analogy as a form of understanding.”). 

